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ln tl1e ~tlprcrlle Cot1r·t <)f the

State of Utal1

WIUIA W. WOOTTON,
;·
Plaintiff and Respondent,

CASE

vs.
COMBINED INSURANCE COMPANY
OF AMERICA,
)
~Defendant and Appellant.

NO. 10108

I

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by plaintiff, as beneficiary of a life
insurance policy issued by defendant on the life of her
deceased husband, which action defendant resists on the
grounds that it was fraudulently induced to enter into said
insurance contract by the misrepresentations of plaintiff.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of
plaintiff \Vas granted by the court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment entered and
that the case :be remanded to the lower court for trial
STATEMENT OF FACTS

On or about the 24th day of September, 1962, plaintiff executed an Application for Hospital or Medical-Surgical Policy for and on behalf of Harold Wootton and herself. Said application included an application for an Accidental Death Rider in the principal sum of $5,000.00, covering .the life of HaroJd Wootton only. (Exhibit 1 in deposition
of Wilma W. Wootton) The •application was taken.
'
by Leo Albert Bowen, ·an insurance agent, who was a longtime friend of plaintiff and her deceased husband. (Deposition of Leo Albert Bowen, P. 3) Mr. Bowen asked the
questions which appear on the application and the answers
were written in his handwriting. (Bowen Dep., p. 7) The
answers were written by him just as they were given by
plaintiff. (Bowen Dep., p. 9) Certain questions were
asked concerning the physical condition of the parties proposed to be insured, and the answers given by paintiff were
written on the application. (Items 5, 6, and 7 of the appiication) The application was examined by plaintiff after
it was completed and before it was signed. (Deposition of
Wilma W. Wootton, P. 12) It was then signed by plain·
tiff as ''Mrs. Harold Wootton''. (Application and Wootton
Dep., p. 11) The completed application was forwarded
to defendant, Combined Insurance Company of America,
and }n. reliance thereon an insurance policy was issued, the
same being dated September 24, 1962, to coincide with the
.
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date on \vhich the application was signed. (A copy of said
insurance policy is included in the record) Subsequently,
on the third day of December, 1962, Harold Wootton died
as a rPsttlt of injurie3 sustained in an automobile-pedestrian
accident. Plaintiff made demand upon the defendant for
the payment of the principal sum of $5,000.00 provided for
in the Accidental Death Rider. (Plaintiff's complaint) Defendant declined to pay said claim, on the grounds that it
was induced to enter into the said insurance contract by
reason of intentional misrepresentation of material facts
and contending further that had defendant been informed
of the true physical condition of plaintiff's deceased husband, defendant would not have entered into said insurance
contract. (Defendant's Answer) The misrepresentations
clahned by defendant are based on plaintiff's answers to
questions five, six and seven in the application,. specifically
with respect to the physical condition of Harold Wootton.
The specific nature of the misrepresentations was later set
forth in Answers to Interrogatories which are a part of .
the record. A Motion for Swnmary Judgment was filed by
plaintiff, based on the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories and an affidavit of plaintiff. By stipulation of counsel. the depositions of Leo Albert Bowen and Wilma W.
\rootton were published in total at the time of the argument of the Motion for Summary Judgment. From a decision granting said Motion, defendant appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I

THE RECORD DISCLOSES GENUINE ISSUES OF
MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THESE CONDITIO·NS
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THE GRANTING

OF A MOTION
JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER.

FOR SUMMARY

POINT IT
THE PHYSICAL CO·NDiTION AND MEJD[CAL HISTORY OF AN APPLICANT FOR LIFE INSURANCE

ARE MATTERS MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED
BY THE INSURER, AND MISREPRESENTATIONS AS
TO. SUCH MATTERS FORM THE BASIS FOR AVOIDANCE OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT INDUCED BY
SUCH! MISREPRESENTATIONS.
ARGUMENT

POINT I

THE RECORD DISCLOSES GENUINE ISSUES O·F
MATERIAL FACT, AND UNDER THESE CONDITIONS
THE GRANTING O·F A MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER.
As has been stated by this Court on many occasions,
a summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings, depo-

sitions, affidavits and admissions show that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. If there is
any genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion should
be denied. (In re Williams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83~ 348
P2d 683; Young vs. Felornia, 121 Utah 646, 244 P2d 862)
Both in the lower court and on appellate review, the
party against whom the summary judgment is granted is
entitled ·to the benefit of having the court consider all of
the facts p~resented and every inference fairly arising there-
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from in a light most favorable to him. (Morris vs. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 259 P2d 297). This Court
has recently reiterated this pr()position in the case of Kidman vs. White, 14 Utah 2d 142, 378 P2d 898, in the following language:
.. . . . a summary judgment, which turns a party out
of court without an opportunity to present his evidence, is a harsh measure that shoud be granted only
when, taking the view most favorable to a party's
claims, and any proof that might properly be adduced
thereunder, he could in no event prevail."
Based on these criteria, defendant respectfully contends that the record which was before the trial court and
is now before this Court, amply discloses that there are
genuine issues of material fact whi·ch can only properly
be resolved upon a trial of this matter on its merits.
Such issues of material fact concern the question of whether
plaintiff intentionally misrepresented the physical condition of her husband, Harold Wootton, in the application
for insurance. An examination of her answers to questions five, six and seven on said application diseloSe that
she revealed that Hlarold Wootton had polio at the age of
three, that he had a slight limp resulting therefrom, that
he had completely recovered from said condition and had
had no recurrences, and that he was now in good health
and free from any physical defect, injury or disease, ·and
\Vas not no\v under medical care.

When plaintiff's deposition was taken, she was asked
if she had signed a written report of an interview which
she had with a Mr. Gibson on January 9, 1963. She admitted that the report bore her signature, and did not
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deny that she read it before signing it.

The statement
which she signed concerned the death of her husband,
Harold Wootton, and was as follows:
"On 12/3/62 he walked out of cafe, crossing the road
to pick up his car, and was hit by a car. The driver
said he never even saw my husband until too late. He
said he just saw a shadow and didn't even know what
·he hit. My husband's correct date of birth is 1/16/07,
and he was employed as plant operator for the Provo
River WateT Users until 7/15/62, \\"hen he retired, going on aid for disabled due to his polio. lie was advised to retire by Dr. Smith, Provo, Utah, and I undersrfa.nd he said my husband might lose the use of
his good leg if he didn't stay off of it." (Emphasis
ours) (Wootton Depos., P. 18 and 19.)
In the same deposition, plaintiff stated that she married Harold Wootton in 1951 (Wootton Dep., P. 5) and that
his condition remained the same from the time of said marriage until the time of the death of Harold Wootton. (Wootton Dep., P. 17) Also, that there was no substantial
change in the condition of Harold Wootton from September 24, the date on which the application was signed, to
December 3, the date of his death. {Wootton IDep., P. 16)

With that foundation as to the physical condition of
Harold Wootton, the following exchange of questions and
answe~rs appears on Page 20 of the said deposition:
"Now, Wilma, on November 27, 1962, Harold filed
an application ·with the Social Security Administration
claiming to be completely and totally disabled, did he

not?
A.
· Q.

I don't know .
You mean to say that you had no knowledge

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7

of that application, if there was such an application
made?
A. I don't say I don't have no knowledge of it.
\Vhat I am saying is that the last five years I have
lJe('\n under an emotional strain and things don't come
back clear to me. And Harold's death never done it
any good either, even then. I have been under Dubois
until I couldn't afford it any longer.
Q. So \Vhat you are saying is you don't remember this at this time, but you might have known it at
the time?
A. I might have known it at the time . . . "
If in fact the condition of Harold Wootton had not

changed from September 24, 1962, to the date of his death,
and if in fact he, with the knowledge of the plaintiff, filed
an application on November 27, 1962, claiming to be. completely and totally disabled, it would seem to follow, as the
night the day, that he could not have been in "good health
and free from any physical defect, injury or disease" as
represented by plaintiff at the time of ·the signing of the
application on September 24, 1962.
Again, referring to the physical condition of Harold
\Vootton, the following appears on Pages 13 and 14 of the
deposition of Wilma W. Wootton:

When did Harold tenninate his employ.ment
with the Provo River Water Users
A. I think it was July 15.
Q. \Vhy did he terminate?
A. Well I don't exactly lmow why he terminated,
other than the change-over on the job up there. The
job was too much for him . . .
Q. Did you discuss why the job was too much
"Q.

for him?

A.

Yes.

When he first went up there he had
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control over the powerhouse. That is all he had to
do. And then they put him in charge of the chlorinating station and house cleaning and cutting the lawns.
And in his condition he couldn't hold his end up.
Q. You say "in his condition". What was there
about his condition?
A. This condition existed then.
Q. What condition?
A. The polio. He had restricted work that he
:could do. He ·could not he on his legs all day.
Q. Isn't it true, Mrs. Wootton, that for about
a year or two prior to the time that he terminated
that he had been having a lot of trouble with falling?
A .. H·arold had trouble with falling all his life."

Again referring to Item 7 of tile application, we fail
to see how a person who ''had trouble with falling all his
life'' could be ''free from any physical defect, injury or
disease'' especially if such falling were caused by residuary
muscle weakness as a result of polio.
It is of. extreme sgnifican~ce that the statements made
to the agent who completed the application concerning the
condition of Harold Wootton were markedly different from
the statements made by plaintiff in her deposition. In
this connection, the following appears on Page 14 of the
deposition orf .Leo Albert Bowen:
"Q. (By Mr. Paulson) If I understand you cor·
rectly, Mrs. Wootton told you in substance that her
husband had had polio when he was three years old;
that he now had a limp which you already knew, but
that limp wasn't causing him any particular problem
at ·the time this application was taken.
· A. · That is right.·
Q. Is this correct?

A.

Yes."
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We have quoted at some length from the depositions

primarily tor the purpose of showing that even the plaintiffs o\vn testimony, when compared with the representations n1ade in the application, indicates some material misrepresentations of the physical condition of Harold Wootton
at the time the application was signed by plaintiff. This
comparison of the depositions with the application, suppleInented by the balance of the recol-d, and viewed in a light
most favorable to defendant clearly indicates that there
are genuine issues as to material facts ·here·in which issues
can only be properly resolved by a trial of this matter on
its merits.
PO~INT

II

THE PHYSICAL CONDITION AND MEI)ICAL HISTORY OF AN APPLICANT' FOR LIFE INSURANCE
ARE l\1ATTERS MATERIAL TO THE RISK ASSUMED
BY THE INSURER, A.J."'\!D MISREPRESE·N'rATIONS AS
TO SUCH MATTERS FORM THE BASIS FOR AVOIDANCE OF AN INSURANCE CONTRACT IND,UCED BY
SUCH MISREPRESENTATIONS.
The law is well established that the health of an applicant for insurance on his life, health or bodily condition
is of vital importance to the insurer, and questions to elicit
information on the subject and in regard to illnesses and
ailn1ents of such person are proper to be asked and should
be truthfully answered. The general rule with respect to
the effect of an untrue statement concerning these matters
is stated as follows:
''The rule is unanimous that an untrue statement in regard to a material matter affecting the health or phys..

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
ioal condition of an applicant for life insurance, who
knows the statement to be untrue, will allow the insurer to avoid the policy .
'' (29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 742, P. 999)
This general rule is implicitly recognized in this State
by the presence of the following statutory provision in our
Insurance Code:

31-19-8. "Materiality of misrepresentations - Warranties - Presumptions and burden of proof. - (1) Except as provided in subsection (2) , no oral or written
misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance contract, by the insured or in his
behalf, shall be deemed material or defeat or avoid
the contract or prevent it attaching, unless such misrepresentation· or warranty is made with the intent to
deceive.

The insured shall have the burden of proof that
such misrepresentation or warranty was not made with
intent to deceive.
(2) In ·any application for life or disability insurance made in writing by the insured, all statements
therein made· by the insured shall, in the absence of
fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties.
· The falsity of any such statement shall not bar the
right to recovery under ·the contract unless it materially affected ei·ther the acceptance of the risk or the
hazard assumed by the insurer.'' (This provision was
amended in 1963, but the language quoted herein was
the statute as it existed at the time of the signing of
the application in this case.)
Tvvo questions are suggested by the statute in its ap-

plication to the case at bar, i.e., the question of materiality
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o1 the misrepresentations and the question of intent. These
will be discussed in that order.

Many courts in many jurisdictions have attempted to
d~\finc the rnateriality of representations made to induce
the issuance of an insurance contract. Without multiplying cases, it would appear that the definition of this Court
in Fidelity & Casualty Company vs. Middlemiss, 103 Utah
429, 135 P2d 275 is as complete as any we have examined.
Therein, the Court said:
"A material representation is one which ordinarily would

influence the prudent insurer in determining whether
to accept or reject a risk, or in fixing the amount of
the premium in the event of such acceptance, or in
excepting some risk or part thereof from coverage . . .
a material fact is any fact, the knowledge or ignorance
of whi~h would naturally influence the insurer's judgment in making the contract, in estimating the degree
and character of the risk, or in fixing the rate of insuranc-e.''
The same general principle has been stated by the
Dela\vare court in Prudential Insurance Company of America vs. Gutowski, 113 A2d 579, as follows:
''And a condition or disease is sufficiently serious to

justify the Court in finding it material to the risk if it
would naturally have persuasive influence upon the
insur~r's determination with respect to undertaking
an insurance contract.''
It should be abundantly clear that the facts concerning the physical condition of Harold Wootton would have
naturally influenced the judgment of the defendant .in the
case at bar as to whether an accidental death insurance
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policy should be issu~ by said defendant. It is the contention of defendant that had it been apprised orf the facts
that Mr. Wootton "had trouble with falling all his life", had
terminated his employment on the advice of a physician,
had gone "on aid for disabled due to his polio" and was in
such condition fuat he made an application with the Social
Security Administration for total disability benefits, that said
defendant, as stated in its Answer to the COmplaint orf plaintiff, "would not ·have entered into said insurance contract
wi1Jh said decedent and plaintiff."
With respect to the question of an intent to deceive
as referred to in Title 31-19-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
Supra, it was stated in Prudential Insurance Company of
America vs. Willsey, 10 Cir. 1954, 214 F2d 729:
"Therefore it seems that Utah is firmly committed to
the rule that no misrepresentations or warranties made
in the negotiation of an insurance contract shall defeat or avoid that contract unless such representations
are made with an intent to deceive."
This conclusion was reached in the case cited above as
a result of an analysis of several previous cases, concluding
with New York Life Insurance Company vs. Grow, 103 Utah
285, 135 P2d 120. In those cases (all decided prior to
1947) it had been uniformly ·held that in order to avoid
an insurance contract, the insurer must prove that material misrepresentations were made with an intent to deceive. The insurer had the burden of proof on all of those
issues. This was stated by the court in New York Life
Insurance Company vs. Grow, Supra, as follows:

"It was the burden of plaintiff to establish actual fraud
on the part of the insured, that he made the material
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shown by the application knowingly
and \Vith intent to deceive and defraud the plaintiff
insurance company.''

misn~presentations

A very significant change in the law occurred when
in 1947 the legislature of Utah passed the statute cited as
Title 31-19-8, Supra, which contained the following provision:
"The insured shall have the burden of proof that such
misrepresentation or warranty was not made with intent to deceive." (Emphasis ours)

This statutory change in the law with respect to the
burden of proving intent or lack of intent to deceive becomes
:nore significant in light of a recent decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. In the case
of Castagno vs. Occidental Life Insurance Company of Raleigh, North Carolina, D. C. Utah, 151 F. Supp. 781, a case
similar to the case at bar in that a plaintiff was suing on
a life insurance policy and the defense was a claimed misrepresentation, the court states the following, pertaining
to the matter of intent:
"There is a presumption of intent to deceive from the
knowing concealment of material facts, unless such
presumption is overthrown by substantial evidence."
(Citing Zolintakis vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States, 10 Cir. 1938, 97 F2d 583,
See also Id., 10 Cir., 108 F2d 902.)

Applying these principles to the case at bar, the record,
viev.'ed in a light most favorable to defendant, would ~
tainly permit the indulgence of the presumption of an intent to deceive from the knowing concealment of the rna-
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terial facts heretofore mentioned. At this point, the burden shifts .to plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of
the evidence that she had no such intent to deceive. The
reco:vd (again viewed in a light most favorable to defendant) certainly does not sustain plaintiff's burden of proof
on this issue. Hence, another genuine issue of material fact
is shown to exist ,the resolution of whlch can be accomplished only by a trial of this matter on its merits.
To plaintiff's anticipated contention that the presumption cannot be indulged because of insufficient evidence of
concealment of material facts, a judicial definition of some
of fue terminology used in the application would appear to
support the contention that such concealment was done by
plaintiff. It will be noted that in item seven of the application, an affirmative answer was given to the question as
to whether the proposed insured was in "good health".
This term was defined in Braddock by Smith vs. Pacific
Woodmen Life Association, 89 Utah 75, 54 P2d 1189 as

follows:
"The general rule appears to be that the tenn "good
health" when used in a policy of life insurance means
that the applicant has no grave, important or serious
disease, and is free from any ailment that seriously
affects the general soundness or healthfullness of the
system."
It is readily apparent from the testimony of plaintiff
in he~r deposition that her deceased husband was not in
"good health" as so defined at the time the application
was signed by her, and it is likewise apparent that she
knew that he was not in good health.
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CONCLUSION
The trial coutt erred in granting plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment. The decision should be reversed and
remanded for trial.

Respectfully submitted,
FORD R. PAULSON, for
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON & TAYLOR
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
55 East Center Street
Provo, Utah
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